We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core nonemptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games. 
1 of the well known Scarf-balancedness condition ( [9] ) guaranteeing the existence of a core partition as well.
Clearly, the set of all core partitions of a hedonic game is internally stable, i.e., any partition that is in the core cannot be dominated (in a sense to be de…ned) by another core partition. However, as we show in Section 3, neither the weak top coalition property nor the ordinal balancedness condition assure that the core enjoys external stability, i.e., it may happen that a non-member of the core is not dominated by any core partition. Moreover, there is no superset of the core of the games considered, which is both internally and externally stable; i.e., there is even no stable set ( [13] ) in these games. A stronger version of the weak top coalition property (the top coalition property) does not guarantee the external stability of the core, either.
In this paper we show that imposing size monotonicity on players' preferences over individually rational coalitions in hedonic games has two implications: (1) it guarantees the existence of a core partition, and (2) strengthening this condition to strong size monotonicity allows for a full characterization of the set of core partitions which turns out to be also externally stable and thus, the unique stable set (cf. Section 4). The domain of (strongly) size monotonic hedonic games includes the aversion to enemies type of preferences studied in [4] , and it covers for instance situations in which a person joins a group as to increase her local status (cf. [14] ).
Our work is also related to the study of core stability in two-sided matching problems and in non-transferable utility (NTU) games. Stable sets in one-to-one matching problems were studied in [6] and it was in particular shown that the (non-empty) core in such problems is the unique stable set if and only if it is a maximal set which is a lattice with the unmatched agents being identical for all matchings in the set. However, as shown in [6] , this result do not extend to many-to-one matching problems. Hence, as many-to-one matching problems are special hedonic games, it is not surprising that we need a rather strong condition as to assure the external stability of the core. On the other hand, a hedonic game can be seen as an NTU game, where for each coalition the set of feasible payo¤ vectors is a cube (cf. [3] , p. 209). Most of the literature on stable sets in NTU games is devoted to the study of the relationships between largeness (cf. [10] ) and external stability of the core for the case of convex games (cf. [7, 11, 8] ). For general NTU games it was shown in [2] that if the core is large, then it is a stable set. In order to establish this result, one needs however a no-level-segment condition imposed on the sets of feasible payo¤ vectors; this condition is clearly not satis…ed when looking at a hedonic game as an NTU game.
Preliminaries
Consider a …nite set of players N = f1; : : : ; ng. A coalition is a non- We assume that each player i 2 N is endowed with a preference i over N i , i.e., a binary relation over N i which is complete and transitive.
We denote by = ( 1 ; : : : ; n ) a pro…le of preferences. Moreover, we assume that the preference of each player i 2 N over coalition structures is purely hedonic, i.e., it is completely characterized by i in such a way that, for each C; C 0 2 C N , player i weakly prefers C to C 0 if and only
A hedonic game on a …nite set N of players with a preference pro…le is denoted by the pair (N; ).
De…nition 1 Let (N; ) be a hedonic game and C 2 C N . Then C is a core partition for (N; ) if there does not exist a coalition S such that
Let (N; ) be a hedonic game. Given two coalition structures C and C 0 , and a coalition S 2 C, we say that C dominates C 0 via S, denoted by
Moreover, we simply say that
De…nition 2 Let (N; ) be a hedonic game and V C N . Then V is called a stable set of (N; ) if the following two conditions hold:
A stable set of a hedonic game does not allow for inner contradictions, i.e., any partition that is stable can not be dominated by another partition that is also in the stable set. Moreover, every coalition structure excluded from the stable set is dominated by some partition in the stable set. Observe that the set of all core partitions is internally stable, and hence, it is a subset of each stable set, and if it is also externally stable, then it is the unique stable set of the corresponding game.
3 Top coalitions, ordinal balancedness, and stable sets As a starting point, let us consider two well known su¢ cient conditions for non-emptiness of the core in hedonic games -the weak top coalition property and the ordinal balancedness condition introduced in [1] and [3] , respectively. The …rst condition imposes a certain degree of commonality in players' preferences and it is mainly motivated by the multiplicity of economic applications as illustrated in [1] . The second condition is in fact an ordinal version of the Scarf-balancedness condi-tion ( [9] ) which is often used to prove the non-emptiness of the core in NTU games.
De…nition 3 Given a hedonic game (N; ) and a non-empty player set X N , a coalition S X is (1) a top coalition of X if for any i 2 S and any T X with i 2 T
we have S i T , and (2) a weak top coalition of X if it has an ordered partition fS 1 ; : : : ; S`g such that (i) for any i 2 S 1 and any T X with i 2 T we have S i T , and (ii) for any k > 1, any i 2 S k and any T X with i 2 T we have
A hedonic game satis…es the (weak) top coalition property if for each non-empty player set X N , there exists a (weak) top coalition of X.
As it turns out, the top coalition property does not guarantee the external stability of the core (Game 1), while its weaker version is not su¢ cient for the existence of stable sets in hedonic games (Game 2).
Game 1 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and players'preferences be as follows: Claim Game 1 satis…es the top coalition property and its core is not externally stable.
Proof. It is easy to check that each singleton and each doubleton is a top coalition of itself, and that 23 is the unique top coalition of 123, i.e., the game satis…es the top coalition property. The core partitions are f1; 23g and f123g. Notice however that the partition f13; 2g is blocked only by 12, and 12 does not belong to any core element, i.e., the core of the game is not externally stable. It is worth mentioning that the coalition 123 (which is the unique member of a core partition) is not a 5 top coalition of itself.
Game 2 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and players'preferences be as follows: Claim Game 2 satis…es the weak top coalition property and it has no stable set.
Proof. The fact that the above game satis…es the weak top coalition property was shown in ( [3] , p. 212), i.e., we have only to show that it has no stable set.
Let C 1 = f1; 2; 3g, C 2 = f12; 3g, C 3 = f13; 2g, C 4 = f1; 23g, and we conclude that there is no stable set in this game.
As we shall see next, the ordinal balancedness condition does not guarantee the existence of stable sets in hedonic games either. In other words, if we would like to check whether a game is ordinally balanced we have to …nd for each balanced family of coalitions a partition of N , in which every player is weakly better o¤ in comparison to her worst situation in the corresponding balanced family.
Game 3 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and players'preferences be as follows: Claim Game 3 is ordinally balanced and it has no stable set. (ii) strongly size monotonic, if it is size monotonic and for each i 2 N and X; Y 2 R(N; ) \ N i , jXj > jY j implies X i Y .
As we …rst show, there are strongly size monotonic games which satisfy neither the weak top coalition property nor the ordinal balancedness condition.
Game 4 Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and players'preferences be as follows: Claim Game 4 is strongly size monotonic and satis…es neither the weak top coalition property nor the ordinal balancedness condition.
Proof. Consider …rst the weak top coalition property and take the set X = f1; 2; 3g. We show that there is no weak top coalition for X. Notice that no one of the singletons can be a weak top coalition for X because of Proof. Let (N; ) be size monotonic and consider the following procedure.
Set P := N and C := ;.
Repeat the following steps until P becomes empty.
-Select one of the largest members of R(P; jP ), say X;
-Set P := P n X and C := C [ fXg.
Return C.
Obviously, the outcome C of this procedure is a coalition structure.
We show that C is a core partition.
Let K = jCj and X 1 ; : : : ; X K be coalitions such that C = fX 1 ; : : : ; X K g with X k (1 k K) being the k-th coalition put into C by the above procedure. In addition, let P 1 = N and P k = P k 1 n X k 1 for each 2 k K. We have then jX 1 j : : : jX K j and
Moreover, we have from the procedure that jX k j jY j for each Y 2 R(P k ; jP k ), and by size monotonicity, X k i Y holds for
there are no deviations from C which belong to fY 2 2
Note additionally that
Finally, from X K = P K , we have fY 2 2 Proof. Let (N; ) be strongly size monotonic and consider the following procedure with a coalition structure C as its input.
Repeat the following steps.
-Find the collection P of all largest members of R(P; jP ).
-Test whether C \ P = ;. If so, return P and halt; otherwise set P := P n X, where X 2 C \ P .
Observe that this procedure always halts for any given coalition structure, and the set P N obtained by applying it to a coalition structure C is empty if and only if C 2 (N; ).
Suppose C = 2 (N; ) and let P N be obtained by the procedure applied to C. Then, we have P 6 = ; and let X be one of the largest members of R P; jP . Notice then that each coalition in C \ 2 P is either not in R P; jP or is of size strictly smaller than that of X. For each i 2 X, C(i) = 2 R(P; jP ) implies X i fig i C(i), while by strong size monotonicity, jC(i)j < jXj implies X i C(i). Therefore, X is a deviation from C, and thus, C is not in the core of the game.
Finally, observe that there exists at least one member of (N; )
including X, and therefore for every C = 2 (N; ), there exists at least one C 0 2 (N; ) including a coalition X satisfying X i C(i) for each i 2 X, i.e., (N; ) is externally stable.
As our last example shows, strong size monotonicity is crucial for the external stability of the core.
Game 5 Let N = f1; 2; 3g and players'preferences be as follows: Claim Game 5 is size monotonic but not strongly size monotonic and its core is not externally stable.
Proof. The game is not strongly size monotonic as 13 1 1. The core partitions are f1; 23g and f13; 2g (and both of them can be found by applying the procedure in Theorem 1). Notice however that the partition f123g is blocked only by player 3, and the singleton containing that player does not belong to any core element, i.e., the core of the game is not externally stable.
